The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph no-go theorem provides an argument for the reality of the quantum state based on certain assumptions, most of which are common to the familiar no-go theorems of Bell, Kochen & Specker, etc. The exception is their assumption of preparation independence, which has been subject to a number of criticisms. We propose a much weaker, physically motivated notion of independence, which merely prohibits the possibility of super-luminal causal influences in the preparation process. This is a minimum requirement for maintaining a reasonable notion of subsystem. Under the weaker condition, it is shown that the argument of PBR becomes invalid. We propose an experiment involving randomly sampled preparations that recovers an approximation of the result, which becomes exact in the limit as the sample space of preparations becomes infinite, thereby proving a stronger theorem asserting the reality of the quantum state. It involves one further assumption that the experimental devices are tolerant to infinitesimal amounts of noise. Unlike that of PBR, the result holds even in the presence of non-local correlations in the global ontic state.
INTRODUCTION
A number of recent theorems have addressed the issue of nature of the quantum state [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . On the one hand, one might consider the quantum state as corresponding to, or being uniquely determined by, a real, physical state of the system it describes, just as the classical state (i.e. a point in classical phase space) corresponds to a real physical state of a classical system. On the other hand, the quantum state differs from the classical state in that it only allows us to make probabilistic predictions about the system. Therefore, one might consider that it merely represents our partial knowledge of some underlying physical state of the system. Plausibility arguments can be given to support either view, which are referred to as ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic, respectively [6] . The theorems go a step further and prove that under certain assumptions the ψ-epistemic view is untenable. We are especially concerned with the first of these results, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem [1] , which has received the most attention and is considered by some to provide the most convincing case for the reality of the quantum state [7] .
Most of the PBR assumptions are common to the familiar no-go theorems of Bell [8] , Kochen & Specker [9] , etc., with the exception of preparation independence. The case is argued for replacing this with a much weaker, physically motivated notion of independence, which merely rules out the possibility of superluminal causal influences playing a role in the preparation process. This is considered a minimum requirement for having a reasonable notion of subsystem. We analyse the PBR argument, showing that it breaks down under this weaker assumption, and provide an explicit ψ-epistemic toy model to reproduce their predictions.
This would appear to re-open the door to the possibility of statistical or ψ-epistemic interpretations of the quantum state. However, we show that, even under this minimum condition, an experiment to demonstrate approximate ψ-ontology may be devised. In the most general case, it involves one further assumption that the experimental devices are tolerant to infinitesimal amounts of noise. The result becomes exact in an appropriate limit, thereby proving a stronger ψ-ontology theorem. It works by showing that while it is possible to contrive ψ-epistemic toy models to account for PBR-type experiments, the degree to which any ontological theory can be ψ-epistemic is limited by the degree to which one is free to compose (sub)systems in that theory. In other words, once one moves beyond simple, idealised toy models, the ψ-epistemic view again becomes untenable.
INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTIONS
The first assumption is that a system has an underlying physical state, described by λ ∈ Λ, which is referred to as the ontic state of the system. This may or may not coincide with the quantum state. The space Λ of ontic states is analogous to classical phase space. Furthermore, it is assumed that for each quantum pure state ψ there corresponds a probability distribution µ ψ over Λ. Preparation of the system in the quantum state ψ results in an ontic state sampled according to the distribution µ ψ (Fig. 1) . It is also assumed that the outcome of any measurement on the system depends solely on its ontic state. Together, these assumptions encode the notion that quantum systems should be described by some (possibly deeper or underlying) ontological theory.
The second major assumption is that, whatever this ontological theory might be, its predictions should agree with those of quantum mechanics. No-go theorems arise when it is found that predictions disagree. Experimental tests may then be proposed to decide between quantum and ontological theories; though, to our current knowledge, all experimental evidence points to the correctness of quantum theory. So far, the assumptions posited are, 
in one form or another, common to the no-go theorems of Bell, Kochen & Specker, etc. In addition to these basic assumptions, each no-go theorem postulates some form of independence for composite systems or observations. For Bell, this is the locality assumption; for PBR, it is the novel assumption of preparation independence: systems that are prepared independently should have uncorrelated ontic states. It will suffice to describe this for bipartite systems (Fig. 2) , for which the assumption can be expressed as
where p A and p B are choices of quantum states to be prepared in the respective subsystems. The assumption is perhaps best motivated by the fact that at the operational level it would appear that we can prepare product quantum states on independent systems, and since these should be completely uncorrelated it may therefore be expected that the same situation would hold at the ontological level.
One way in which preparation independence might reasonably be violated, however, is through correlations arising in the ontic states due to a common past (this point has also been raised by Hall [10] and Schlosshauer & Fine [11] ). An effective form of preparation independence could then be recovered by conditioning on this common past ( Fig. 3 ), resulting in a kind of independence that 
We go a step further and propose an even weaker notion of independence. The condition is that the ontic state of one subsystem is uncorrelated with the preparation setting of the other (Fig. 4) ; i.e.
Without this, it would not even be possible to consider the preparation of a state on a single subsystem in isolation without reference to all other subsystems. It can be viewed as an instance what Einstein referred to as the principle of local action [12] [13]:
The following idea characterises the relative independence of objects (A and B) far apart in space: external influence on A has no immediate influence on B; this is known as the 'Principle of Local Action', which is used consistently only in field theory. If this axiom were to be completely abolished, the idea of the existence of (quasi-) isolated systems, and thereby the establishment of laws which can be checked empirically in the accepted sense, would become impossible.
It can also be understood as ruling out, at the ontological level, the possibility of superluminal influences occurring in the preparation process [14] . Both preparation independence (1) and the common past assumption (2) 
THE PBR ARGUMENT BREAKS DOWN
The PBR theorem demonstrates a contradiction between the predictions of quantum theory, on the one hand, and of preparation independent ontological theories with epistemic quantum state on the other. In order to obtain this contradiction, it is supposed that distinct quantum states ψ and φ induce distributions µ ψ and µ φ that have overlapping supports on the space of ontic states (cf. Fig. 1 (b) ).
1. PBR consider a preparation device that is capable of preparing a system in either of these quantum states, i.e. p A ∈ {ψ, φ}. Precisely, they suppose that regardless of which preparation is made there is probability at least q > 0 of this device generating an ontic state in the overlap region [18].
2. In the simplest case, they then consider a second such preparation device with p B ∈ {ψ, φ} (cf. Fig. 2 ) and invoke the assumption of preparation independence to deduce that, regardless of which individual preparations are made, there is probability at least q 2 > 0 of both systems having ontic states in the overlap regions.
The remainder of the argument (summarised here [19] ) is not immediately relevant, since in the absence of preparation independence this is the step at which it breaks down.
Suppose the preparation devices behave according to Table I . We can take marginals of the probability distributions to consider either subsystem in isolation, in accordance with (3), and we find that there is probability at least q that its ontic state lies in the overlap region. Nevertheless, when we look at the system as a whole we find that it can never occur that both ontic states lie in the overlap region at once.
It is not difficult to find a ψ-epistemic ontological model in which preparation devices behave according to Table I , that satisfies condition (3), and that reproduces the quantum statistics of the PBR experiment. If we set Λ := {λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 } and let µ ψ have support {λ 1 , λ 3 } and µ φ have support {λ 2 , λ 3 } (i.e. ∆ := {λ 3 }), then Table I determines the behaviour of the preparation devices [20] . 
We choose the following measurement response functions.
The quantum mechanical predictions for the PBR experiment can be recovered by calculating the probabilities
A STRONGER THEOREM
In the simplest case, the PBR experiment involves a conclusive exclusion measurement [21] on m = 2 preparations. In general m depends on the angular separation of ψ and φ [22] . We now consider an experiment in which any conclusive exclusion measurement on m preparations is performed, with the crucial caveat that these preparations are uniformly sampled from a large number n m preparation devices. The quantum mechanical predictions will be the same regardless of which m systems the preparations come from.
In the case that the overlap region is infinite, we also posit a further assumption that the measurement device may have access to the joint ontic state with any arbitrary finite precision, but not with infinite precision. This ensures that the device is tolerant to an infinitesimal amount of noise in reading the ontic state. Theorem 1. Suppose distinct quantum states ψ and φ induce distributions µ ψ and µ φ whose supports overlap on some region ∆ of the ontic state space, and consider any conclusive exclusion measurement on m preparations uniformly sampled from n {ψ, φ}-preparation devices. For n m, the quantum mechanical predictions cannot be recovered by any ontological model with finite device precision and satisfying the subsystem condition.
Proof. If it can be shown that there is a non-zero probability of obtaining a joint ontic state that is compatible with every joint preparation, then no ontological model can account for the quantum mechanical conclusive exclusion measurement (which in every instance must preclude some joint preparation).
If ∆ is finite, we choose an arbitrary λ ∈ ∆. There exists some > 0 such that, for each individual subsystem, regardless of preparation choice, the ontic state is λ at least of the time. If it happens that all m systems have ontic state λ at once, then the joint ontic state is compatible with every joint preparation. It remains, therefore, to rule out possible behaviours of the devices in which correlations ensure that no choice of m systems may have ontic state λ at once (e.g. Table I ). This is achieved by the random sampling of preparations from n devices, with n sufficiently large.
For example, with m = 2, such correlations would require that no two systems can have ontic state λ at once, while each system has ontic state λ at least of the time, and we obtain the bound ≤ 1 /n. In general, at most m − 1 systems may have ontic state λ at once, and we obtain the bound
where x := min{y ∈ Z | x ≤ y}. In the large n limit, therefore, such behaviour can always be ruled out.
If ∆ is infinite, we choose any (arbitrarily small) open set U ⊆ ∆ beneath the precision to which the measurement device has access to the ontic state; i.e. such that the device cannot distinguish between ontic states in U . We can similarly ensure that, regardless of preparation choices, and with n sufficiently large, there is non-zero probability of all m ontic states lying in U . When this happens, as far as the device is concerned the joint ontic state is compatible with every joint preparation and again we obtain a contradiction.
CONCLUSION
While it is always possible to contrive ψ-epistemic toy models for PBR-type experiments, similar to the one presented here, any full-blown ontological theory that admits arbitrary composition of (sub)systems and in which devices that are tolerant to infinitesimal amounts of noise is necessarily ψ-ontic [23] .
Note also that the first part of the proof, in which finite device precision plays no role, can be understood as providing an 'excess baggage' result (comparable to [24] ): any ψ-epistemic ontological model would require infinite ontic states to describe either one of the quantum states ψ or φ.
We consider this theorem to provide a stronger case for the reality of the quantum state on the basis that, in light of the theorems of Bell and Kochen & Specker, it is known that any ontological theory that accounts for the predictions of quantum theory will necessarily have non-local global correlations at the ontological level (e.g. Bohmian mechanics [25, 26] ). In contrast to that of PBR, this theorem proves ψ-ontology even if non-local correlations in the global ontic state are permitted.
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